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Page Title:
A Cable Tray Fire At a Commercial Nuclear Power Plant |
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|  DOE-STD-1058-93
A CABLE TRAY FIRE
AT A COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
his case study covers a cable tray fire
power. To remove decay heat, low pressure
T
at a commercial nuclear power plant.
water from the condensate pumps and
An event description of operator actions
manual operation of primary relief valves
necessary to fight the fire and maintain
were used until normal decay heat removal
control of the plant is included.
systems could be made operational. Control
power to motor operators and pump
Successfully extinguishing a fire is
controls was established using temporary
difficult under ideal conditions; combining
jumpers allowing the plant to be brought to
fire fighting efforts with a plant shutdown
a stable shutdown condition. There was no
requires forethought and planning.
release of radioactivity.
OVERVIEW
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT
he commercial nuclear power plant
his commercial nuclear power plant is
T
T
experienced a serious inplant cable
a three-unit boiling water reactor site.
tray fire. The fire was started by an
At the time of the event, Units 1 and 2 were
engineer who was using a candle to check
in operation at 100% power. Unit 3 was
for air leaks through a fire wall penetration
under construction.
seal. The fire spread and was fought on
Activities Preceding the Fire
both sides of the reactor building and cable
spreading room wall by plant and local
community fire fighting personnel. Efforts
The plant is designed so the air
to put out the fire were made difficult by
movement from one plant area to another is
several factors: delay in notifying personnel
controlled by supply and exhaust fans and
of the exact location of the fire, physical
will always be toward the area of possible
location of the fire in the cable trays, and the
higher radiation. The reactor building and
high differential pressure between the cable
refueling floor is the area of lowest
spreading room and the reactor building that
pressure. The standby gas-treatment system
resulted in high air flow rates through the
must exhaust air from the reactor building to
wall.
maintain a negative pressure. In order not
to exceed the capacity of this system,
The effects of the fire on the plant
inleakage to the reactor building must be
were almost immediate. All Unit 1
kept at a minimum.
emergency core cooling systems were lost,
as well as the capability to monitor core
B-5
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