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|  DOE-STD-1058-93
above the floor.
Their attempts at
were concerned about the effects of grounds
extinguishing the fire were unsuccessful.
and shorts on plant operation and also the
When the assistant shift engineer arrived at
potential personnel hazards associated with
the scene, he took charge of the fire-fighting
fighting fire in electrical cabling with water.
efforts and evacuated all construction
Effects on Plant Operation
workers from the reactor building. Heavy
smoke reduced area visibility and made the
use of breathing apparatus necessary. An
The first indication of the fire's effect
hour and ten minutes after the fire started,
on Unit 1 operation came 20 minutes after
all ac lighting in the reactor building was
the fire started with the almost simultaneous
lost. Soon after lighting was lost in the
annunciation
of
several
alarms:
reactor building, the decision was made to
"RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL OR
concentrate on fighting the fire in the cable
CORE
SPRAY
AUTOMATIC
spreading room. This was necessary
BLO WD O WN
PE RMI SSI VE , "
because the cable spreading room fire was
"REACTOR
WATER
LEVEL
beginning to affect the operability of plant
LOW-AUTOMATIC BLOWDOWN," and
systems and because the control room was
"CORE COOLING SYSTEM/DIESEL
located directly above the cable spreading
INITIATE."
room. Consequently, limited fire fighting
took place in the reactor building. When the
The control room operators observed
fire in the cable spreading room was
that normal conditions of reactor water
extinguished four hours after the start of the
level, reactor steam pressure, and drywell
fire, the assistant shift engineer, who had
atmosphere pressure existed, so they were
been directing activities in the cable
confused by the alarms. Over the next
spreading room, took charge of fire fighting
8 minutes, several events occurred,
in the reactor building. Because of limited
including the automatic starting of residual
visibility, wires and ropes were used as
heat removal and core spray pumps, the
guides by fire fighting personnel.
high-pressure coolant-injection pump, and
Eventually, temporary dc lighting was
the reactor core isolation coolant pump. In
installed. Teams of two to three people
addition, control board indicating lights
were relayed into the fire area to discharge
were randomly glowing brightly, dimming,
fire extinguishers and then return. Water
and going out; numerous alarms occurred;
was not used as an extinguishing agent until
and smoke came from beneath Panel 9-3,
later that evening, seven hours after the fire
which is the control panel for emergency
started. After water was continuously
core cooling systems. The operators shut
applied for 10 minutes,
down equipment that was not needed, such
the fire in the reactor building was
as the residual heat removal and core spray
extinguished. Water was initially not used
pumps, only to have them restart again
to fight the fires because plant personnel
automatically.
B-8
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