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plutonium metal and oxide storage packages, it is reasonable to expect that failures
would follow a pattern typified by the bathtub curve. Surveillance Programs should
1) account for the increased failure rate anticipated early in the life of the storage
package; 2) recognize the lower inherent "mid-life" failure rate; and 3) monitor for
the onset of end of life conditions.
There are at least three possible storage configurations that span the risks
associated with plutonium storage. One configuration places the storage package in
a vault that relies on the containment function of the storage package to ensure
public safety. Another places the storage package in a vault that does not rely on
the integrity of the package, and in which the primary risks involve worker safety. A
third possible storage configuration places the storage package in some sort of
container or over-pack. If the over-pack does not rely on the integrity of the storage
package, then the condition of the storage package may not be important to safety,
except as it may affect risks associated with opening the over-pack. The surveillance
program should take into account the risks associated with storage (i.e., the
consequences of failures as well as their probabilities). The program should consider
the balance between these risks and surveillance costs, both in terms of economic
impact and personnel exposure to radiation or other hazardous environments, in
determining the parameters of the surveillance program.
Finally, there are two broad classes of "problems" that surveillance is expected to
detect. The first class could be called "anomalies" because they are single events
that occur more or less randomly in a large population of storage packages. The
second class could be called "systemic" because they affect a significant fraction of
the storage packages, and generally represent an unanticipated condition in those
packages. The surveillance program is expected to be able to distinguish between
these two classes and to provide information upon which corrective or other action
can be based.
The surveillance program should document the surveillance "philosophy" in terms of
the characteristics described above. Then, it should apply that philosophy to the
specific storage situations that may be encountered. For example, in a facility that
relies on package integrity for public safety (i.e., where the container is designated
safety class") and in which the packages are easily accessed and inspected, a

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