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relatively high. These failures are generally the result of mistakes made in
manufacturing the product that were not detected during production inspections. In
the case of storage packages described in this Standard, inadequate stabilization
could also contribute to such failures. This is followed by a relatively low failure rate
period, which describes most of the life of the product. Then, as the product reaches
its end of life, the failure rate again climbs to relatively higher values. The relative
magnitude of the three parts of the curve will vary depending on the type of product
and manufacturing process. In light of the lack of long-term storage data on these
plutonium metal and oxide storage packages, it is reasonable to expect that failures
would follow a pattern typified by the bathtub curve. Surveillance Programs should
1) account for the increased failure rate anticipated early in the life of the storage
package; 2) recognize the lower inherent "mid-life" failure rate; and 3) monitor for
the onset of end of life conditions.
There are at least three possible storage configurations that span the risks
associated with plutonium storage. One configuration places the storage package in
a vault that relies on the containment function of the storage package to ensure
public safety. Another places the storage package in a vault that does not rely on the
integrity of the package, and in which the primary risks involve worker safety. A third
possible storage configuration places the storage package in some sort of container
or over-pack. If the over-pack does not rely on the integrity of the storage package,
then the condition of the storage package may not be important to safety, except as
it may affect risks associated with opening the over-pack. The surveillance program
should take into account the risks associated with storage (i.e., the consequences of
failures as well as their probabilities). The program should consider the balance
between these risks and surveillance costs, both in terms of economic impact and
personnel exposure to radiation or other hazardous environments, in determining the
parameters of the surveillance program.
Finally, there are two broad classes of "problems" that surveillance is expected to
detect. The first class could be called "anomalies" because they are single events
that occur more or less randomly in a large population of storage packages. The
second class could be called "systemic" because they affect a significant fraction of
the storage packages, and generally represent an unanticipated condition in those
packages. The surveillance program is expected to be able to distinguish between

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