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DOE-STD-6003-96
6.2.2.3 Nonradioactive Worker Hazards
Nonradioactive worker hazards at large fusion facilities typically include the following:
a. a large number of high-voltage electrical systems, some of which are custom designs;
b. cryogenic materials such as liquid helium and nitrogen in significant quantities for
magnet operation and plasma diagnostics;
c. class III and IV laser systems for plasma diagnostics;
d. large electromagnetic fields for plasma magnetic confinement and heating;
e. high power radio frequency and microwaves for plasma heating;
f.
rotating devices including centrifuges for vacuum pumping and plasma fueling; and
g. large vacuum chambers and extensive vacuum piping.
As stated in DOE-STD-6002-96, existing Federal regulations (e.g., OSHA standards in
29 CFR 1910 and 1926) provide requirements on control of industrial hazards to workers in
such areas as asphyxiation, electrocution, exposure to cryogenic materials, vacuum, and rotat-
ing machinery as well as hazardous substances.
One area where there are not specific regulations is exposure to electromagnetic fields.
Fusion facilities should be designed to limit static electromagnetic field exposures to personnel
during routine operations. More information in this area is provided in Section 2.3.4. The major
concern for the fusion designer is to minimize large fringing electromagnetic fields because they
could create difficulties for access near the fusion island during troubleshooting and mainte-
nance activities. Measurements of real-time worker exposure to electromagnetic fields should
be provided to ensure the limits given in Chapter 2 are not exceeded.
6.3 Systems Involved with Potential Safety Concerns
Because of the large impact facility design options have on potential hazards affecting
public and worker safety and the developmental nature of fusion, only two safety functions could
be identified at this time as applying to all fusion facilities: confinement of radioactive and haz-
ardous material (Section 6.2.1), a public safety function, and control of operating hazards
(Section 6.2.2), a worker safety function. Additionally, potential design-specific safety concerns
that should be considered during the design process to minimize challenges to the public safety
function of confinement of radioactive and/or hazardous materials have been identified:
a. ensuring afterheat removal when required;
b. providing rapid plasma shutdown when required;
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