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| DOE-STD-3006-2000
plan-of-action should provide a basis for determination of the depth of the review of individual criteria or
core requirements.
Criteria and review approaches are developed for each core requirement, which specify the level of detail
that is appropriate for that issue. The following factors and their implications should be considered in
developing the depth of the ORR and should be considered in preparation of the plan-of-action:
C
Physical modifications to the facility: Any modification must be assessed for its potential effect on
facility hazards and risks, on the facility safety basis as documented in the Safety Analysis Review
(SAR) and associated Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), on facility procedures, on the need for
personnel to be trained on the reconfiguration, etc. In addition, the integrity of the facility design
baseline may need to be verified.
C
Procedural changes: Changed or new procedures must be reviewed to determine if they have been
adequately verified and validated, if the operators have been adequately trained on the modified
procedures, and if the procedures at the workstations clearly reflect the changes.
C
Personnel changes: Continuity of the operations team must be assessed to determine if significant
loss of experienced personnel has occurred and, if so, has been adequately mitigated. Training and
qualification of new and reassigned personnel must be verified.
C
Length of shutdown: There is a characteristic loss of operator familiarity with normal facility
operations that increases with the length of the shutdown. If the shutdown is unusually long, a review
and possibly requalification of the operators may be necessary. There are also physical processes
(corrosion, radioactive decay, evaporation, etc.) that may become important following an extended
outage. The longer the outage and the more complex the activity during the outage, the more rigorous
should be the review to identify unanticipated changes.
C
Overall hazard characteristics of the facility: The nature of the hazards to safety and the environment
associated with a facility/process are a major component in determining the depth of the ORR. The
depth of an ORR for a facility that handles small quantities of tritium gas would not be as complex as
one that handles large quantities of plutonium.
Appendix 1-4
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