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Hazard and Accident Analyses - doe-std-1104-96_cn3new0023
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Safety Management Program Characteristics - doe-std-1104-96_cn3new0025


DOE-STD-1104-96
other hazardous materials, and consideration of the need for analysis of
accidents which may be beyond the design basis of the facility.
The hazard analysis results are clearly characterized in terms of public
safety, defense in depth, worker safety, and environmental protection.
The logic behind assessing the results in terms of safety-significant
SSCs and designation of TSRs is understandable and internally
consistent.
Subsequent accident analysis clearly substantiates the findings and
delineations of hazard analysis for the subset of events examined and
confirms their potential consequences. Events potentially exceeding
evaluation guidelines need to clearly identify associated safety-class
SSCs and basis of TSR deviations.
The goal of the review is to ensure that the safety basis is comprehensive relative to
hazards presented and is based on a consistent, substantiated logic.
2.3
Safety Structures, Systems, and Components
The next DSA approval basis is safety structures, systems, and components.
Identification of safety SSCs (i.e., safety-class SSCs and safety-significant SSCs) is a
product of the hazard and accident analyses. Determining the adequacy of safety SSCs
generally entails being able to conclude that the DSA contains sufficient documentation
and basis to arrive at the following conclusions:
The safety SSCs identified and described are consistent with the logic
presented in the hazard and accident analyses.
Safety functions for safety SSCs are defined with clarity and are
consistent with the bases derived in the hazard and accident analyses.
Functional requirements and system evaluations are derived from the
safety functions and provide evidence that the safety functions can be
performed.
Control of safety SSCs relevant to TSR development is clearly defined.
2.4
Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements
Derivation of technical safety requireme nts is the next of the DSA approval bases.
Hazard controls are derived to eliminate, limit, or mitigate hazards and are generally
safety SSCs or commitments to safety management programs, which are ultimately
included in TSRs. Identification of TSRs results from the most significant preventative
and mitigative features identified in the hazard and accident analyses and from the
designation of safety SSCs. Determining the adequacy of the derivation of TSRs
generally entails being able to conclude that the DSA contains sufficient documentation
and basis to arrive at the following conclusions:
TSRs are identified to ensure adequate protection of workers, the public,
and the environment.
The bases for deriving TSRs, that are identified and described in the
hazard and accident analyses and safety SSC chapters, are consistent
with the logic and assumptions presented in the analyses.
11


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