This technical standard applies to the conduct of hazard analyses and preparation of Hazard Analysis
Reports (HARs) for Nuclear Explosive Operations (NEOs) conducted by DOE/NNSA. This standard
addresses operation-specific HARs and their interface with facility safety basis documents (Safety
Analysis Reports [SARs] or other DOE/NNSA-approved safety basis documents). Federal rule 10 CFR
830, "Nuclear Safety Management," uses the term "Documented Safety Analysis" (DSA) for both the
facility SAR and the operation-specific HAR. This standard will continue to use the acronyms SAR and
HAR in their traditional sense. The HAR is prepared and maintained by the Production Plant Contractor
(PPC). This Standard shall also be applied to any DSA that involves weapon response (e.g., site-wide
The purpose of this technical standard is to clarify DOE/NNSA expectations and to provide guidance for
preparing HARs for NEOs. The general requirements for operation-specific HARs are those contained in
Chapters 2-5 of DOE-STD-3009-94, Change Notice 2, "Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy
Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis", or superseding directives. These general
requirements are more fully developed in this standard in order to account for issues unique to NEOs and
interface issues with the facility or special operations (e.g., transportation).
The scope of the HAR must address the full scope of operations, if not covered in a SAR, for which DOE
authorization is sought. The HAR shall include the operational processes, equipment, facility or facility
interfaces, and operation-unique activities related to manipulations and movements within the facilities
where the activities are to be conducted. The HAR shall consider all hazards that could lead to
Inadvertent Nuclear Detonation (IND), High Explosive Violent Reaction (HEVR), and radioactive or
other hazardous material dispersal, and adverse Worker Safety (WS) effects from a weapon assembly.
Material Dispersal includes tritium release, mechanical and burning release of special nuclear material,
and toxic material release. The HAR is not required to address deliberate unauthorized acts.
Routine industrial accidents, resulting in only worker consequences such as falls, electrocution, etc., are
not part of these analyses, even if uniquely caused by operational conditions. The HAR evaluation should
ensure that all (non- industrial) potential operational and facility hazards are addressed and that process-
specific and common-facility controls applicable to the NEO are identified.
As stated in DOE-STD-3009, or superseding directives, the overall objective of the hazard and accident
analysis portion of a SAR is to identify controls and establish their adequacy through la rgely qualitative
methods. The objective of a HAR is the same with the difference in focus of covering a specific NEO. A
HAR, together with its associated SARs and Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs), should provide all
necessary information, either directly or by reference, in order to make the decision to authorize a NEO.
The format and content of chapters 3 through 5 of a HAR are the same as those described in STD-3009.
Chapter 1 of the HAR is different from STD-3009 in that it is an executive summary that provides an
overview of the HAR and its main conclusions. Chapter 2 will include the NEO process description.
6. APPROACH TO HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
The analytical approach to hazard and accident analysis in a HAR is the same as that described in Chapter
3 of STD-3009. This standard discusses features of this approach that are unique to nuclear explosive