operations. Information that supports the documentation used in the preparation of the HAR shall be
complete and accurate in all material respects as required by 10 CFR 830 Subpart B, Appendix E,
Paragraph 2. DOE/NNSA expects a reasonable level of conservatism using engineering judgment
throughout HAR development.
6.1 Evaluation and Analysis
Hazard evaluation characterizes the identified hazards in the context of the actual NEO process. Some
hazards may originate from within the nuclear explosive itself (e.g., internal power supplies, energetic
devices). As discussed in DOE-STD-3009, or superseding directives, the process of hazard evaluation is
qualitative in nature and intended to result in effective controls for prevention or mitigation of
The hazard evaluation must be comprehensive in its identification of the physically meaningful hazard
scenarios (i.e., determined to be non-negligible contributors to accident scenario probabilities) and
potential controls. This evaluation is best achieved by initially identifying hazards, controls, and their
safety functions in the hazard analysis process in close association with weapon configurations and
process steps to establish a final control set. This necessitates that the hazard analysis table follow single,
or properly grouped, process steps, weapon configurations, and/or tasks so that controls can be clearly
linked to potential hazards associated with each. This clear linkage between hazard scenarios and
controls also clarifies the important process of safety function definitions.
Hazard scenarios must be fully developed and account for factors that influence scenario progression such
as controls and physical phenomena (e.g., sufficient voltage, capacitance). This evaluation should include
the generation of energy, possible ways to apply the energy to the weapon with consideration of potential
controls, and then the application of energy to a sensitive component that could lead to undesired
consequences. The first two elements of the analysis are developed by the PPC (in consultation with the
Design Agencies (DAs) as appropriate), to define the weapon environment, while the DA weapon
response determines the last element. The definition of the boundary between the hazardous environment
and the weapon response is critical to the proper characterization of the hazard scenarios. The boundary
definition must be well understood by both the PPC and the DA and shall be documented in the HAR.
All hazard scenarios are listed in a hazard table that shall be included in the HAR. Those hazards that are
not screened shall be listed with potential controls in a summary hazard table also included in the HAR.
The following table is a suggested format of a summary hazard table that must be included in the HAR
and present conclusions of the hazard analysis suitable for NEOs.