Specificity of Administrative Controls

DOE-STD-1120-2005/Vol. 1

independent readings, and assurances that calculations needed within administrative controls are

independently verified).

Specificity of Administrative Controls→

General

More Specific

Very Specific

Description of

General

Defined safety

Defined Limits and

administrative

Commitment to

management program

commitments

control

Implement a Safety activities or elements

Management

and/or Operational

Program

Parameters

When To

SSCs are available

SSCs are available, but

SSCs are unavailable or not

Apply

and used to control are not completely

cost beneficial (i.e., short

the hazard

effective in controlling a

duration decommissioning)

hazard

and only administrative

controls are used to control

the hazard

Level of

ACs contribute to

Important to safety;

Primary or contributing

Importance of

safety by ensuring

needed to protect an

control selected from the

administrative

programmatic

initial condition in the

hazard/accident analysis as

control-

elements are

hazard analysis or

a major

available

selected from the

mitigative/preventive

hazard/accident analysis

feature(s)

to supplement other

mitigative/preventive

features

Example

"A combustible

"The fire protection

"Combustible wastes shall

control program

program shall ensure that

be maintained below 100

shall be established

combustible wastes are

pounds in the facility"

for the facility"

removed daily during

TRU waste packaging

activities"

Severity of Hazards→

Figure 1. Specificity of Administrative Controls

2.5

Change Control Process

During the performance of decommissioning work, changes may be necessary to facility systems

or work plans that are not anticipated. In order to ensure that the safety basis is current,

adequate, and documented, it is important that a change control process be developed that

considers the significance of proposed changes and links to the USQ process to determine if

DOE approval of the change will be necessary.

Unanticipated changes or discovery of new information may also affect a condition, parameter,

or assumption that helped support the basis for downgrading a facility below hazard category 3.

Such changes should be subjected to a management of change process to evaluate potential

impact on the approved safety basis that supported a downgrade. Violation of certain

assumptions and controls could invalidate the downgrade such as changes in radionuclide

material inventory, form of material, dispersibility (e.g., changes in container storage or energy

2-5