Notification - doe-std-1136-20040194

DOE-STD-1136-2004

Guide of Good Practices for Occupational Radiation Protection in Uranium Facilities

Example: The postulated release of a quantity of a uranium compound will produce a

radiological consequence corresponding to the classification criterion for Alert. The

chemical toxicity of the uranium compound is such that the non-radiological

consequence exceeds the criterion for Site Area Emergency. The postulated release

should be classified as a Site Area Emergency.

The appropriate classification for the postulated event or condition should be determined during the

hazards assessment process and the observable features and indications identified as Emergency Action

Levels (EALs) for that event/condition.

9.2.2.4 Notification

The specific properties of the hazardous material do not significantly affect the content of this

program element.

9.2.2.5 Consequence Assessment

As discussed above, models and calculational methods used for consequence assessment should be

appropriate physical, chemical, and radiological properties of the hazards. Models used to calculate and

project the radiological and non-radiological consequences of a release of uranium and its compounds

should be the same ones used in the hazards assessment process. If the same models are not used, the

differences between outputs should be characterized and documented to avoid the potential for confusion

and indecision during response to an actual emergency.

Environmental monitoring capabilit y for assessing consequences of a uranium release should

conform to several general principles.

Procedures for measurement of airborne uranium should provide for timely analysis and

reporting of results in units that correspond to decision criteria. Decision points based on

initial screening measurements with field instruments should account for the expected

levels of radon progeny collected on the air sample media. Portable survey instruments

capable of performing alpha spectroscopy measurements can be used to provide rapid

isotopic analysis of uranium collected on sample media.

Measurement of uranium deposition should be planned and proceduralized to yield results

that correspond to those produced by the predictive models used for emergency response.

The correlation between direct or indirect radioactivity measurements (in units of

activity) and measurement methods that give mass or concentration of uranium in a

sample should be established for the expected enrichment values of material that might be

rele ased.

If the potential exists for release of uranium compounds with high chemical toxicity (such

as UF6), it is not practical to plan to use survey teams to quantify concentrations in a

plume. The high risk to survey personnel, the protective equipment necessary to minimize

that risk, the time needed to prepare and position a team for such a survey, and the limited

value of the information that could be gained all weigh against this approach to assessing

the consequence of a highly toxic release.

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