Table 6-6. Accidents in Processing Plants

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

6.0 Inadvertent Nuclear Criticality; Total Fission Yield

Table 6-6. Accidents in Processing Plants

(Paxton, 1980)

Date

Plant

Total fissions

First pulse

Doses (Rads)

Notes

1.3 x 1018

7 x 1016

235

6/16/58

Y-12

365, 339, 327,

U solution

270, 236, 69,

washed into

69, 23

drum

1.5 x 1017

12/30/58

LASL

4400 (fatal),

135, 35

concentrated

in solvent

layer

4 x 1019

1017

235

50 R, 32 R,

U solution

10/16/59

Idaho CPP

mostly beta

siphoned into

tank

6 x 1017

235

1/2/61

Idaho CPP

None

U solution

forced into

cylinder by air

8.2 x 1017

1016

87, 33, 16

Pu solution in

4/7/62

RECUPLEX

sump sucked

into tank

1.3 x 1017

1017

235

10000 (fatal),

U solution

7/24/64

Wood River

Junction

two 60-100

poured into

tank

1015

Negligible

8/24/70

Windscale

concentrated

in trapped

solvent

3 x 1018

235

10/17/78

Idaho CPP

Unknown

None

U buildup in

diluted scrub

solution

assumes, in its Regulatory Guides (NRC, April 1977, NRC, April 1979, NRC, July 1979),

an initial burst of 1E+18 fissions followed by 47 bursts of 1.9E+17 fissions at ten minute

intervals for eight hours for a total of 1E+19 fissions. The boiloff of 100 liters solution is

postulated to terminate the excursion, implying a relatively large system. Since the 1E+19

total fissions has been in use for a long period, appears to bound most historical and

estimated yields, and is not substantially less than the maximum historical occurrence or

Woodcock estimate, it is assessed to be the bounding reference yield. The excursion is

assumed terminated by the evaporation of 100 liters of solution over eight hours.

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