Facility Support Systems

DOE-HDBK-3010-94

Appendix B; Production Support Lab

g-Level

Probable Damage

0.12

Onset of potential for utility equipment failures. Highest value

at which continued supply of electrical power can be assumed.

Represents threshold of ventilation unavailability due to loss of

power. Interior unreinforced concrete block wall cracking and

possible localized failures. General failure of non-concrete

walls.

0.13

Major cracking in external walls. Onset of external glovebox

connection pipe and wiring failure. Excessive slippage due to

failed weldments between girders and columns on the south wall

of the building causes partial collapse of roof in the ventilation

and HEPA plenum area (i.e., southeast quadrant, ≈ 25% of room).

≥ 0.15

General building collapse.

3.1.5 F acility S u p p ort S ystem s

3.1.5.1 N u clear Incid en t M on itors

Four sets of two nuclear criticality incident monitors each detect and alarm in excessive

radiation fields. These detectors are spaced so as to provide overlapping coverage by a

minimum of three monitors at any point in the facility. They provide flashing light and bell

ringing indications when activated. The units are designed to alarm on any internal failure

and receive power via an uninterruptable power supply.

3.1.5.2 N u clear C riticality D esign M itigation an d C on trol S ystem s

There are only two major contaminated liquid holding tanks in the H-7 building. These are

the plenum deluge catch tank and the waste holding tank, each of which are equipped with

borated raschig rings to prevent criticality during abnormal conditions. During normal

operation, there is no reason to believe critical accumulations of plutonium in the tanks can

occur.

All transfers of material, whether samples, sample recycle, or waste pails, are limited to one

defined critically safe unit at a time.

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