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Requirements Related to Analysis of Specific Types of Hazards
A second group of hazard analysis activities can be characterized as having in common a focus on
specific types of hazards or hazardous conditions. Hazard analyses that fall into this category
include the following:
Fire Hazards Analysis (DOE 420.1)
Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (DOE 420.1)
Natural Phenomena Hazards Assessment (DOE 420.1)
Various Hazard Specific Regulations (e.g., Beryllium Hazards Assessment (10 CFR 850),
OSHA regulations for asbestos and lead (1910.1001 and 1910.1025)
Since each of these analyses is focused on a generically different hazard, there is little apparent
overlap among requirements in this group. However, there are some basic links among these
hazard analysis activities that should be considered, as well as a need for integration with nuclear
safety analysis or PrHA activities.
Fire hazards analysis (FHA), is required for all nuclear facilities or facilities that present unique
or significant fire risks. This involves a comprehensive evaluation of fire hazards, including
postulation of fire accident scenarios and estimates of potential consequences (i.e., maximum
credible fire loss). DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety, requires that conclusions of the FHA be
integrated into safety analysis reports (or DSAs per 10 CFR830). The DOE Implementation
Guide G-420.1/B-0 (G-440.1/E-0) addresses this integration as follows:
"When both an FHA and a SAR are developed for a facility, the developmental effort
should be coordinated to the maximum extent possible to avoid duplication of effort. It is
recognized, however, that because an FHA is based on the premise that a fire will occur
and considers fire safety issues (property loss and program discontinuity potential) that are
not normally considered in the SAR, the conclusions of the FHA may be more conservative
than would normally be developed by a SAR alone. Nevertheless, the FHA and its
conclusions should be addressed in the facility SAR in such a manner as to reflect all
relevant fire safety objectives as defined in Paragraph of DOE 420.1 and Section 2
of Attachment 1 of DOE 440.1."
Although not stated, this same principle would apply to PrHA efforts at non-nuclear hazardous
facilities that are subject to DOE 420.1.
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has noted several instances at DOE sites where
FHAs are inconsistent with accident assumptions found in nuclear safety analysis (e.g., fire
barriers were assumed in the safety analysis where they weren't present). FHAs should be
coordinated and integrated through teaming of fire safety personnel with hazard/accident
analysts, and any conflicts related to FHAs and DSAs should be resolved prior to the
approval of the DSA. A white paper on the topic of FHAs and safety analysis efforts has been
prepared by members of the DOE fire safety community, and is provided in Attachment 3.
Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations. DOE O 420.1 also requires a Nuclear Criticality Safety
Evaluation (NCSE). An NCSE is an evaluation focused on facility piping, vessels and design
features to identify the parameters, limits, and controls needed to prevent an inadvertent
criticality. While this activity is not duplicative of safety analysis efforts, coordination and

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