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| DOE-STD-1027-92
initiated events (e.g., floods or earthquakes). Inherent energies within the process
(e.g., reactivity, temperatures, and pressures) should also be described.
Those accident initiators inappropriate for the facility or process under consideration
should be eliminated, and the Hazard Analysis should include the rationale for doing
so. For example, if the process does not include any liquid material and the potential
for spill does not exist, this potential initiator should be eliminated at the Hazard
Analysis level, with a brief discussion of the reasons for the elimination.
4.1.1.c
Preventive Features
Hazard Analysis identifies any structure, system, or component that serves to prevent
the release of hazardous material in an accident scenario. Preventive features may
include passive barriers such as piping, material containers, material cladding,
gloveboxes, or facility structures as well as systems or components such as pressure
relief valves, monitoring systems for material concentrations with automatic actions to
stop or isolate the process, or dilution systems to control explosive or flammable
mixtures. The discussion should begin with the preventive feature closest to the
hazardous material or mixture, end with the preventive feature farthest from the
hazardous material or mixture, and include all preventive features which may
contribute to preventing the release of the hazardous chemical or radioactive material.
Mitigative Features
4.1.1.d
Hazard Analysis identifies any structure, system, or component that serves to mitigate
the consequences of a release of hazardous materials in an accident scenario.
Mitigative features may include passive barriers such as dikes, confinement systems,
or containment systems; or active systems or components such as air cleanup
systems, sump systems, dilution systems, and liquid cleanup system. The discussion
should begin with the mitigative feature closest to the point of uncontrolled release, end
with the mitigative feature farthest from the hazardous material or mixture, and include
all mitigative features which may contribute to reducing the consequences of a release
of the hazardous chemical or radioactive material to affected on-site and off-site
populations.
4.1.2
Accident Analysis
The effort expended in performing an accident analysis in the SAR is a function of
the hazard and the complexity of a particular process, and will build upon the Hazard
Analysis already performed. There are a wide variety of techniques available. A
primary objective of the graded approach to accident analysis is to select and apply
a rigorous analysis technique which provides sufficient detail to assess each
postulated accident or failure, the resulting consequences, and all means of
prevention or mitigation.
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