Summary and Conclusions

DOE-STD-3007-93

The following limits have been established:

Failure Limit (k = 1.0)

405 FGE Pu-239

Operating Limit

160 FGE Pu-239

(<45% of failure limit)

[Note: The term "Failure Limit" is local to the INEL]

Compliance with the following DOE-ID and CFR requirements has been demonstrated:

DOE-ID 5480.5A

Double Contingency Principle (see Section 6.0)

Mass Control (operating limit < 45% of critical mass)

10 CFR Part 71 Sections 71.55 and 71.61

Optimum moderation, reflection, and geometry was analyzed (71.55).

Twice the number of allowed packages (undamaged or damaged) is

subcritical when optimally configured, moderated, and reflected (i.e., twice the

operating limit of 160 FGE of Pu-239 or 320 g Pu-239 is less than the

minimum mass of Pu-239 required to obtain a k-effective value of 0.95 in a

polyethylene-water environment under optimum conditions (71.61)).

From a criticality safety view point, shipments of radioactive waste that are limited to a

single cask containing no more than 160 FGE of Pu-239 may be safely made within the

boundaries of the INEL. Specific limits for casks that have their own approved criticality safety

evaluation supersede the limits established by this analysis.

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