History Review

DOE-STD-1052-93

7.8.3.5

If the answers to any of the above questions are "yes," the

failure mode should be addressed by a PM task or be evaluated

for a possible design change to eliminate or control the failure

mode. If the answers to the questions are "no," and the

likelihood for failure is also low, then the failure mode is

considered to be insignificant since the consequences may be

tolerated. If a failure mode may be tolerated, it is not essential

to perform a PM task to mitigate the failure. If all failure modes

may be tolerated, the component was incorrectly selected as

FCE and the component should be considered for run-to-failure

operation. Existing PM tasks for the component should be

considered for possible deletion.

If the failure mode should be addressed by a PM task, indicate

"yes" in the column marked "significant mode" of the FMEA

tabulation form and select a PM task as described in Section 8,

"Preventive, Maintenance Task Selection and Implementation"

7.8.3.6

Before the FMEA is approved, it should be reviewed by

knowledgeable technical support and maintenance personnel to

ensure the analysis was comprehensive and technically accurate.

FMEA reviews may be performed in meetings with the

appropriate personnel to expedite the review and gain insight for

future analysis.

7.9

History Review

The history review plays a vital role in the PM program enhancement effort. For the

system analysis process, the review should be conducted after the FMEA. This helps

to avoid biasing the outcome of the analysis to only agree with the results of the

history review. This may result in overlooking some failure modes or inadequately

addressing some components.

After the FMEA is completed, the history and all the activities routinely scheduled for

the component should be reviewed. At least two operating cycles, approximately

three years, of corrective and preventive maintenance data along with any surveillance

data should be evaluated. History for components performing identical functions in

similar environments for multi-unit sites should be included. Data older than two

cycles may be of limited value since it may not reveal any new failure modes or the

cause of the failure may have been subsequently resolved. When reviewing the

component's history, the analyst should attempt to identify the following:

failure modes

D - 32