Guidance Keyed to Sections in DOE

DOE-STD-1134-99

II. GUIDANCE KEYED TO SECTIONS IN DOE-STD-3007-93

1.0 Introduction

This introductory material is very general in nature and not of technical consequence. It should

contain enough information to let the reviewer know why the evaluation was performed. The

introduction should also contain a statement of what is being evaluated. This section has no

safety significance and no technical comments should ensue from a review.

2.0 Description

This section must contain sufficient descriptive technical detail to understand and reconstruct the

system being analyzed. The description of the operation should include drawings or sketches

sufficient to allow the reviewer to make a determination that the model and analysis assumptions

apply to the system described herein. If the system is complex, drawings and documents may be

included by reference (e.g., an approved, field verified, process description). The key question

for the reviewer to ask is, "From reading this section can I get a good picture of what's being

evaluated?" If the answer is no, then deficiencies exist. The deficiencies must be resolved.

As a rule of thumb, personnel familiar with the system under analysis should perform technical

reviews of CSEs. At a minimum, the reviewer should possess enough knowledge of the

system/process being analyzed to independently judge the accuracy of the process description

(PD) insofar as it impacts the safety conclusions contained in the CSE. If the reviewer is not

familiar with the system, facility walk-downs and discussions with the SME should be performed

prior to completing the review. In the absence of system knowledge, all a reviewer can state is

that the evaluator did indeed analyze what was purported to be analyzed (i.e., the CSE is

internally consistent).

Discrepancies in the system description are likely to be in the area of disagreements with the

model assumptions and the "as built, as found" condition in the facility. These will only be

discovered by facility walk-downs. Before walk-downs are initiated, a determination of the

sensitivity of the reactivity of the system to changes in parameters should be made. The

determination should be made by whatever means deemed prudent by the reviewer. In most

cases, this determination will be the technical judgment of the reviewer based on his experience

and knowledge. For example, if the model shows worst case full flooding of a glovebox remains

subcritical, the safety of the system does not depend on the presence or absence of a criticality

drain. On the other hand, if analysis shows greater than 2" of solution on the floor of the

glovebox goes critical, then the presence of a functioning criticality drain is essential. Both the

requirement of the drain and for regular inspection of the drain should be clearly identified in the

evaluation and a walkdown performed to verify this attribute. Another example is annular

solution storage tanks. The thickness of the annulus must be nominally the same as that assumed

by the evaluation. However, the height of the tank does not significantly affect the reactivity of