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1.0 Introduction
This introductory material is very general in nature and not of technical consequence. It should
contain enough information to let the reviewer know why the evaluation was performed. The
introduction should also contain a statement of what is being evaluated. This section has no
safety significance and no technical comments should ensue from a review.
2.0 Description
This section must contain sufficient descriptive technical detail to understand and reconstruct the
system being analyzed. The description of the operation should include drawings or sketches
sufficient to allow the reviewer to make a determination that the model and analysis assumptions
apply to the system described herein. If the system is complex, drawings and documents may be
included by reference (e.g., an approved, field verified, process description). The key question
for the reviewer to ask is, "From reading this section can I get a good picture of what's being
evaluated?" If the answer is no, then deficiencies exist. The deficiencies must be resolved.
As a rule of thumb, personnel familiar with the system under analysis should perform technical
reviews of CSEs. At a minimum, the reviewer should possess enough knowledge of the
system/process being analyzed to independently judge the accuracy of the process description
(PD) insofar as it impacts the safety conclusions contained in the CSE. If the reviewer is not
familiar with the system, facility walk-downs and discussions with the SME should be performed
prior to completing the review. In the absence of system knowledge, all a reviewer can state is
that the evaluator did indeed analyze what was purported to be analyzed (i.e., the CSE is
internally consistent).
Discrepancies in the system description are likely to be in the area of disagreements with the
model assumptions and the "as built, as found" condition in the facility. These will only be
discovered by facility walk-downs. Before walk-downs are initiated, a determination of the
sensitivity of the reactivity of the system to changes in parameters should be made. The
determination should be made by whatever means deemed prudent by the reviewer. In most
cases, this determination will be the technical judgment of the reviewer based on his experience
and knowledge. For example, if the model shows worst case full flooding of a glovebox remains
subcritical, the safety of the system does not depend on the presence or absence of a criticality
drain. On the other hand, if analysis shows greater than 2" of solution on the floor of the
glovebox goes critical, then the presence of a functioning criticality drain is essential. Both the
requirement of the drain and for regular inspection of the drain should be clearly identified in the
evaluation and a walkdown performed to verify this attribute. Another example is annular
solution storage tanks. The thickness of the annulus must be nominally the same as that assumed
by the evaluation. However, the height of the tank does not significantly affect the reactivity of

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