Materials Control - Continued

DOE-STD-1158-2002

Can the operator readily determine compliance with applicable limits from the information available at

the workstation?

Criteria: Section 9.3, Use of Neutron Absorbers

Any use of borosilicate raschig rings shall conform to the requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.5, "Use

of Borosilcate-Glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron Absorber in Solutions of Fissile Material."

Are any processes dependent upon the presence of fixed neutron absorbers?

Are controls in place to monitor the continued effectiveness of credited neutron absorbers?

Are any soluble neutron absorbers credited?

If soluble neutron absorbers are credited, are procedures in place to ensure they remain in their

intended distribution and concentration?

Are practices dealing with fixed neutron absorbers generally consistent with ANSI/ANS-8.21, Use of

Fixed Neutron Absorbers in Nuclear Facilities Outside Reactors?"

Criteria: Section 9.4, Control of Fissile Material Areas

Is access to fissile material handling areas controlled such that only trained, qualified, and authorized

personnel can handle fissile material?

Does facility management verify the qualification of fissile material handlers prior to authorizing work?

Criteria: Section 9.5, Control of Physical Parameters

Are fissile material storage areas in conformance with the requirements of ANSI/ANS-8.7,

"Guide for Nuclear Criticality Safety in the Storage of Fissile Materials" where applicable?

Are containers of residue and product fissile material stored in fixed arrays or have engineered

spacers attached?

When administrative spacing controls are used, has the criticality safety evaluation demonstrated that

the system will remain subcritical in a seismic event?

Are administrative spacing controls credited as unlikely events in criticality safety evaluations?

Where engineered features are credited for criticality control, are inspections conducted to verify they

are capable of performing the intended function?

For solution storage areas are procedures in place to detect concentration and stratification changes

in the solution?

Are unsafe liquid levels or unsafe solution concentrations prevented by engineered controls where

practical?

Are fissile solutions periodically monitored for changes in pH?

Do double-block-and-bleed valve arrangements, or equivalent, where the addition of fissile material is

prohibited, protect isolated, inactive fissile solution storage tanks?

Has the criticality safety evaluation determined that all storage vaults, gloveboxes, and solution

storage arrays will remain subcritical under the same design conditions the building /structure is

designed to withstand (seismic events, flooding, high winds, etc.)?

Does the CSE evaluate the effects of credible, within design basis, natural phenomena events and

show that no single credible abnormal event can cause a criticality accident?

Does fissile material holdup in process vessels, gloveboxes, the HVAC, and other accumulation

points present a credible criticality accident scenario?

Is holdup of fissile material monitored and controlled?

Will fissile material remain subcritical under credible firefighting scenarios?