Appendix I: Application of the Graded Approach in Orr Planning

DOE-STD-3006-95

Appendix 1

may be used in the development of the scope of the ORR is a MORT or readiness tree. The benefit of

this tool is that it is a graphic representation of the elements which must be included. Appendix 3

contains examples of readiness trees which have been useful in developing the scope of the ORR.

Criteria and review approaches are developed for each core requirement, which specify the level of

detail that is appropriate for that issue. The following factors and their implications should be

considered in developing the depth of the ORR:

- Physical modifications to the facility: Any modification must be assessed for its potential effect on

facility hazards and risks, on the facility safety basis as documented in the SAR and associated TSRs,

on facility procedures, on the need for personnel to be trained on the reconfiguration, etc. In addition,

the integrity of the facility design baseline may need to be verified.

- Procedural changes: Changed or new procedures must be reviewed to determine if they have been

adequately verified and validated, if the operators have been adequately trained on the modified

procedures, and if the procedures at the workstations clearly reflect the changes.

- Personnel changes: Continuity of the operations team must be assessed to determine if significant

loss of "corporate memory" has occurred and, if so, has been adequately mitigated. Training and

qualification of new and reassigned personnel must be verified.

- Length of shutdown: There is a characteristic loss of operator familiarity with normal facility

operations that increases with the length of the shutdown. If the shutdown is unusually long, a review

and possibly requalification of the operators may be necessary. There are also physical processes

(corrosion, radioactive decay, evaporation, etc.) that may become important following an extended

outage. The longer the outage and the more complex the activity during the outage, the more rigorous

should be the review to identify unanticipated changes.

- Overall hazard characteristics of the facility: The nature of the hazards to safety and the environment

associated with a facility/process will be a major component in determining the depth of the ORR. The

depth of an ORR for a facility that handles small quantities of tritium gas would not be as complex as

one that handles large quantities of plutonium.

Appendix 1-2