Appendix . Background for DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities

DOE-STD-6002-96

APPENDIX

BACKGROUND FOR DOE-STD-6002-96, SAFETY OF MAGNETIC FUSION FACILITIES:

REQUIREMENTS; AND DOE-STD-6003-96, SAFETY OF MAGNETIC

FUSION FACILITIES: GUIDANCE

This appendix sets forth considerations of key issues given by the Fusion Safety Steering

Committee and Working Group in the preparation of DOE-STD-6002-96, Safety of Magnetic

Fusion Facilities: Requirements, and DOE-STD-6003-96, Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities:

Guidance. The intent is to assist readers in understanding the reasoning and logic behind these

documents and thereby to alleviate misunderstandings and resolve concerns regarding their

content.

The requirements and guidance incorporated in these two Standards beyond those found

in Federal regulations are only binding to the extent that these Standards are included in a

performance contract, except as otherwise mandated by Federal statute or regulation. They are

not expected to be applicable automatically to previously existing facilities.

1. Purpose. DOE-STD-6002-96 and its companion, DOE-STD-6003-96, address safety

in magnetic fusion facilities. DOE-STD-6002-96 was prepared to provide users with a

succinct and comprehensible assembly of safety-based design and operational

requirements specific to fusion facilities. This Standard is written for developmental

facilities constructed after the issuance of this Standard and future commercial facili-

ties. Requirements have been written generically so that this Standard may serve as

a prototype document for any agency that may regulate fusion. These Standards are

intended to provide assurance that magnetic fusion facilities are designed, con-

structed, operated, modified, maintained, and removed from service in a manner that

assures protection of the worker, the public, and the environment. DOE-STD-6003-

96 was prepared as guidance in meeting the requirements identified in DOE-STD-

6002-96 for a near-term facility such as the International Thermonuclear Experimen -

tal Reactor (ITER) in the Department of Energy (DOE) environment.

Requirements found in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) and in directives

derived from them are based primarily on experience with activities related to the

fission fuel cycle, because there had been little experience with fusion at the time of

their development. There are major differences between fusion facilities and other

facilities. These differences should be reflected in the requirements and implementa -

tion of features and processes to achieve safety of fusion facilities.

By their nature, the hazards in fusion are unique in many ways. In fission, the energy

source and inventory are intimately coupled (e.g. in the core), the time scales for

accidents are fairly short, and accident protection and mitigation are more viable than

accident prevention. In fusion, the energy sources and the radioactive inventories are

more distributed, there is a strong ability for accident prevention by careful materials

selection, and the inherent time scales to provide protection or mitigation are gener-

ally longer. Because of the distributed nature of the energy sources and inventories