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DOE-STD-6002-96
credible postulated events, noting the difference in analysis methodologies (conservative vs
best estimate).
Routine releases of nonradiological effluents (including any hazardous materials) shall be
controlled in accordance with Federal, State, and local regulations and permit requirements.
The design shall also provide adequate means for sampling and monitoring of effluents to the
environment.
In the design of confinement barriers, the principles of redundancy, diversity, and
independence shall be considered. Specifically, in the case of multiple barriers, failure of one
barrier shall not result in the failure of another barrier if evaluation guidelines could be exceeded
thereby. Redundancy and diversity shall be considered in the total confinement strategy if new
or untested components of a barrier are used.
The design basis for confinement barriers shall take into account identified postulated ini -
tiating events and extreme loadings and environmental conditions due to anticipated operational
occurrences and off-normal conditions as identified in the safety analysis. In addition, consid era-
tion should be given to the provision of features for the mitigation of consequences of conditions
outside of the design basis to meet the fusion requirement of no off-site evacuation for fusion
facilities.
Consistent with the safety analysis, the design of confinement barriers shall specify an
acceptable global leak rate under off-normal conditions, taking into account the vulnerable
inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials and the potential energy sources available to
liberate such inventories. Any confinement barrier, including equipment, penetrations, seals, etc.
relevant to the establishment of an acceptable leak rate, shall be designed and constructed in
such a way as to enable initial and periodic leak testing.
The following subsections establish the requirements related to the potential safety con -
cerns that may affect the public safety function of confinement of radioactive and hazardous
material.
3.1.1 Ensure Afterheat Removal
The design of fusion facilities shall provide a reliable means to remove any undesirable
afterheat generated by activation products produced by neutron absorption in structures such
that the public safety function of confinement is assured. The need for and reliability of afterheat
removal systems shall be commensurate with the role of afterheat removal in complying with
evaluation guidelines. Passive means are preferable to active means. For facilities with levels of
afterheat that require active cooling, the concepts of redundancy, diversity, and independence
shall be considered in the design of afterheat removal systems.
3.1.2 Provide Rapid Plasma Shutdown
A means of rapid plasma shutdown shall be provided for fusion facilities, if required to
ensure that evaluation guidelines are met. The level of required reliability, redundancy, and
3


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