Ensure Afterheat Removal

DOE-STD-6002-96

credible postulated events, noting the difference in analysis methodologies (conservative vs

best estimate).

Routine releases of nonradiological effluents (including any hazardous materials) shall be

controlled in accordance with Federal, State, and local regulations and permit requirements.

The design shall also provide adequate means for sampling and monitoring of effluents to the

environment.

In the design of confinement barriers, the principles of redundancy, diversity, and

independence shall be considered. Specifically, in the case of multiple barriers, failure of one

barrier shall not result in the failure of another barrier if evaluation guidelines could be exceeded

thereby. Redundancy and diversity shall be considered in the total confinement strategy if new

or untested components of a barrier are used.

The design basis for confinement barriers shall take into account identified postulated ini -

tiating events and extreme loadings and environmental conditions due to anticipated operational

occurrences and off-normal conditions as identified in the safety analysis. In addition, consid era-

tion should be given to the provision of features for the mitigation of consequences of conditions

outside of the design basis to meet the fusion requirement of no off-site evacuation for fusion

facilities.

Consistent with the safety analysis, the design of confinement barriers shall specify an

acceptable global leak rate under off-normal conditions, taking into account the vulnerable

inventories of radioactive and hazardous materials and the potential energy sources available to

liberate such inventories. Any confinement barrier, including equipment, penetrations, seals, etc.

relevant to the establishment of an acceptable leak rate, shall be designed and constructed in

such a way as to enable initial and periodic leak testing.

The following subsections establish the requirements related to the potential safety con -

cerns that may affect the public safety function of confinement of radioactive and hazardous

material.

3.1.1 Ensure Afterheat Removal

The design of fusion facilities shall provide a reliable means to remove any undesirable

afterheat generated by activation products produced by neutron absorption in structures such

that the public safety function of confinement is assured. The need for and reliability of afterheat

removal systems shall be commensurate with the role of afterheat removal in complying with

evaluation guidelines. Passive means are preferable to active means. For facilities with levels of

afterheat that require active cooling, the concepts of redundancy, diversity, and independence

shall be considered in the design of afterheat removal systems.

3.1.2 Provide Rapid Plasma Shutdown

A means of rapid plasma shutdown shall be provided for fusion facilities, if required to

ensure that evaluation guidelines are met. The level of required reliability, redundancy, and