Technical Safety Requirements

DOE-STD-6003-96

resumed until the Authorization Basis has been modified to address the concern, and has been

documented, reviewed, and approved in the same manner as the original Authorization Basis.

These actions, which constitute elements of configuration management of the activity, should be

guided by procedures that provide for ensuring that (1) the probability of hazardous events

associated with the activity, (2) the potential consequences of hazardous events associated with

the event, and (3) the scope of events that could constitute a hazardous challenge to the activity

are encompassed in the documented safety analysis of the activity. Because the basis of risk

acceptance of an activity can involve information sources external to the activity itself, it is also

imperative that the management system for ensuring configuration management of the safety of

an activity contain the elements that will guarantee professional awareness of the lessons

learned throughout the technology of the activity, particularly those that would affect analytical

bases for risk acceptance decisions. Specifically, the activity risk managers must be aware of

the ongoing history of everything used in establishing the activity risk acceptance basis so that

changes in such things as the professional codes, materials properties, analytical models can

be factored into the periodic revisitation and reaffirmation of the safety envelope.

The following are some useful guidelines to be considered when assessing the adequacy

of the configuration management of the fusion activity safety envelope. These guidelines have

been extracted from experiences with the fission USQ process. An activity (ongoing or

contemplated) is or will be outside of the configuration bounds of the activity safety envelope

under any of the following circumstances:

a. if the risk resulting from the product of the event occurrence frequency or the conse-

quences of an off-normal condition assessed and documented in the approved safety

analysis is increased;

b. if the possibility is identified for an off-normal condition of a different type or for a dif-

ferent cause than those assessed and documented in the approved safety analysis

and the off-normal condition type or cause is not clearly encompassed by those off-

normal conditions and causes that are addressed in the approved safety analysis;

c. if the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any TSRs, is reduced.

In addition the guidance explicitly acknowledges the reality and acceptability of encom-

passed but not explicitly stated issues. While not explicitly stated in this guidance, the basis for

acceptability of encompassed issues is the professional judgment inherent in the generation and

various reviews and approvals that are an integral part of the safety analysis and operational

approval process. The implementation guidance for the USQ process is contained in DOE 1991,

"Unreviewed Safety Questions."

5.7 Technical Safety Requirements

Whenever significant safety hazards associated with the fusion facilities are present, the

requirements that define the conditions, safe boundaries, and management or administrative

controls necessary should be identified and agreed upon with the controlling authority to ensure