Safety Envelope Configuration Control

DOE-STD-6003-96

d. normal and emergency operation procedures to be used;

e. identification of hazards;

probability of occurrence and predicted consequences of hazards expressed in quali-

tative or quantitative terms;

g. physical design features and administrative controls provided to prevent or mitigate

potential off-normal conditions;

h. potential off-normal conditions, including those resulting from natural phenomena; and

operational limitations.

Based on the required content of the safety analysis that must be performed for a Below

Hazard Category 3 facility, the format and content for the SAR could be significantly simplified.

Usually, the risks associated with these facilities are rather small, and scoping off-normal condi-

tion assessments would adequately cover the analysis requirements.

5.6 Safety Envelope Configuration Control

Configuration control of the safety envelope, which provides the basis of operational

authorization, is important for fusion just as it should be for any technological activity involving

hazards. The concept adopted in the United States for addressing this issue for nuclear activi-

ties is the Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). The fusion facility needs in this area of configu-

ration control can be adequately addressed by compliance with the following guidance.

The operative requirement for fusion is to ensure that activities are per-

formed within the bounds of an operational safety envelope that adequately

reflects a disciplined hazards identification, risk quantification and risk accep-

tance. The process for accomplishing this is termed safety analysis and the

results of it are documented in a Safety Analysis Report with the operational

limits that characterize the bounds of the safety analysis being labeled Technical

Safety Requirements.

For every activity in a fusion facility a system must be established to ensure that opera-

tions, experiments, and any other work are encompassed by the explicit documented safety

envelope that has been submitted to the activity-approving authority and thereby has become

an inherent part of the facility operating approval and risk acceptance. This process is the

authorization basis as described in Section 5.9.

If at any time it is determined that either (a) a proposed change in physical or operational

configuration in the safety analysis or (b) existing physical or operational conditions (including

previous analytical work) would create or has created conditions that are not encompassed in

the safety analysis that is the basis of the facility Authorization Basis, then the activity associ-

ated with the discovered condition will be ceased (or will not be initiated). The activity will not be