Lessons Learned - hdbk11290053

DOE-HDBK-1129-99

Calibrated tanks and associated piping that are used for pressure-volume-temperature

measurements should have surface treatment of their interiors (e.g., electropolished and

passivated) to allow accurate volume measurements.

Tritium process and handling systems should use, wherever possible, nonflammable hydraulic,

lubricating, and cooling fluids.

The designer should consider not using hydrogenous fluids where they might become

contaminated with tritium.

The designer should consider providing for the retention of firewater with subsequent

monitoring prior to disposal for all buildings where there is tritium.

Barriers should be provided to prevent damage to equipment and injury to personnel while

performing testing operations that could produce missiles or blast pressures. These barriers

should be designed using conservative and proven design principles, such as those of

DOE/TIC 11268, "A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loading of Structures."

An independent air system should be provided for breathing air. It should have dedicated, oil-

free compressors or pressurized cylinders of breathing air, and provide breathing air in all

areas of the tritium facility where it may be needed for maintenance operations and/or

personnel safety. Contamination of the air supply (e.g., from refrigerant leaks or air intakes)

should be detectable at levels low enough so as not to pose health concerns.

The design considerations of the Fire Protection System should include the following:

determining safety classification of SSCs of both fire detection and fire suppression

systems

consideration of unique fire sources (e.g., uranium beds used for tritium storage)

compatibility of fire extinguishing agents with the fire sources in a tritium facility

containing and handling requirements for expended fire fighting agents (including

water inventory) that may become contaminated with tritium

4.6 Lessons Learned

Buildings 232-H, 233-H, and 234-H at SRS, the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF)

located at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and the Tritium Research Laboratory (TRL) at

Sandia National Laboratory, Livermore (SNLL) are examples of facilities that were initially

designed to perform tritium handling. Most other facilities in use were originally designed to do

other work and have been retrofitted to perform tritium handling.

One of the major problems with the facility retrofit process is that the existing utilities such as

ventilation, floor drains, gas supplies, and chilled water systems are shared with the adjacent non-

tritium areas. The same duct work, which is used to sweep released tritium from tritium operating

areas, is used to provide ventilation for offices and non-tritium areas, and, as a result, tritium back

diffuses into the non-tritium areas through the shared duct work. The same chilled water system

used to cool the tritium-related equipment is used to cool the non-tritiated office spaces, and leaks

of tritium-contaminated chilled water result in contamination of clean areas. The floor drains from

the non-contaminated areas drain into the same system as the floor drains from the tritiated areas,

and, through the drains, gases flow from one area to another.